Jan 282012
 

Meet SOPA’s evil twin, ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement )

The brouhaha over the American internet piracy bill has died down, giving way to proposed international legislation with many similar elements.

CNN MONEY

By Dan Mitchell

contributor

January 26, 2012

 


 

sopa

 

FORTUNE —

It’s only fitting that a loud, global outcry over ACTA, an international agreement to govern intellectual property, began just after the anti-piracy bills SOPA and PIPA were shelved by the U.S Congress in the face of massive public pressure. If “copyright maximalists” can’t get legislation passed, writes TechDirt’s Mike Masnick, “they resort to getting these things put into international trade agreements, which get significantly less scrutiny.”

Not that the “maximalists” — including the movie and music industries — were following such a timeline, exactly. ACTA — the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (PDF) — is their backup, and they’ve been working on it for years. It’s stirring protests now because Poland, Ireland and the European Union announced they would sign on this week, moving the pact closer to reality.

Like many trade agreements, ACTA is a confusing mess. Even its signatories don’t agree on how it’s supposed to work. The way it’s been pushed forward has also been unruly — talks have been held in secret, without any kind of legislative oversight or input from citizens or public-interest groups. The public only became aware of it in 2008, a couple of years after discussions began, when Wikileaks published a discussion paper. Since then, drafts of the pact have been released to the public, each successively less onerous to critics. Reportedly, though, big media and pharmaceutical lobbyists have been privy to the talks all along.

Not that the critics are appeased. People in Poland are even marching in the streets in protest. The online vandals of Anonymous have attacked governments and businesses around the world.

Part of the confusion, and ire, comes from the fact that ACTA combines counterfeiting and piracy as if they were similar, when in reality, they’re very different. Counterfeiting is when a customer is duped into buying, say, a fake iPod or a knockoff Gucci handbag. Piracy is when someone, for instance, distributes an unauthorized copy of a movie or song. Different kinds of laws apply to each, or are supposed to. Copyright holders (movie studios, record labels, etc.) often try to meld anti-piracy measures with those aimed at counterfeiting, which are usually less controversial. SOPA and PIPA were similar to ACTA in this regard.

The whole thing is so muddled that it’s not entirely clear what effect it will have on U.S. law or how it’s enforced — though proponents insist that it merely supports current laws by providing a basic legal framework for their enforcement. Critics say it will put Internet service providers in an untenable position, making them potentially liable for their customers’ alleged actions and thereby forcing them to comply with requests from copyright holders for user data, with no due process. It’s one thing when a judge orders you to hand over data. It’s quite another when the order comes from Viacom.

Masnick says the biggest problem with the pact isn’t that it will change U.S. law — it “probably” won’t, he writes — but that it will lock down current law that governs enterprises, like technology and Internet media, that are in constant flux and are driven by innovation. To comply with the agreement, “the US needs to retain certain parts of copyright law that many reformers believe should be changed,” he writes.

Critics also say that activities such as non-commercial file-sharing, which are normally handled by civil courts, could be turned into crimes because the agreement is unclear on precisely what “commercial-scale” piracy is. Piracy for commercial gain is covered, but so is “significant willful copyright or related rights infringements that have no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain.” It all depends on what the meaning of “significant” is. In other words, if you download a movie — or maybe it has to be three movies, or 300 — it’s possible that rather than a summons-server knocking on your door, it would be a cop. But again, this isn’t entirely clear because the language is so vague and because it’s impossible to tell how U.S. enforcement agencies will interpret it.

There are lots of other problematic provisions in ACTA, having to do with seed patents, generic drugs and other matters (watch this space for more), but the loudest criticisms so far have to do with its copyright provisions. In 2010, 75 law professors signed a letter to President Obama urging him not to sign the pact.

They went unheeded. Obama signed the pact — which was originally developed by the United States and Japan — last year. Other current signatories include Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Morocco, Singapore, and South Korea.

There are questions as to whether it was even legal for Obama to sign without the consent of Congress. Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon thinks it wasn’t. In October, he sent a letter to Obama demanding an explanation. Wyden was a vociferous critic of SOPA and PIPA, and has been critical of ACTA as well — particularly the opacity of its development. In particular, he decried the failure “to give the public a say over issues that so profoundly affect their lives.”

 

Direct Link:  http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/01/26/meet-sopas-evil-twin-acta/

Jan 282012
 
The New York Times
North Arabian Sea Journal
By C. J. CHIVERS
January 25, 2012

 

 

Potent Sting Is Prepared in the Belly of a Warship

 

Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
An ordnance handler assembles a 500-pound training bomb aboard the Stennis.

 

ABOARD THE U.S.S. JOHN C. STENNIS, in the North Arabian Sea — Depending on who describes it, a nuclear aircraft carrier can be any number of things: an instrument of national will, a nemesis to be threatened and watched, a fast-moving and wide-ranging city at sea.

When you are aboard one, though, a carrier is an immense warren of spaces and passageways between bulkheads, each with a purpose. There are galleys and offices, stores and workshops, clinics and weight rooms, a barber shop, a recycling center, machine rooms, nuclear reactors and more.

And here was the room that gives the ship its sting: the primary bomb-assembly magazine.

On this night, 17 sailors had climbed through a small circular scuttle on the mess deck and then descended, handhold by foothold, deep below the water line to a space that few sailors see. Nine levels below the flight deck, behind a heavy locked door, in a large, brightly lighted room arrayed with firefighting sprinklers, a dozen BLU-111 bomb bodies rested on metal pallets on the nonskid floor.

It was late, and much of the ship’s crew was asleep. The carrier vibrated as its four screws cut through the dark sea off Pakistan’s southwestern coast.

Several sailors in red shirts took positions near a metal rack topped with rollers. Others carried large metal fins. Still more pried open boxes holding switches and fuzes. Three sailors lifted the first bomb body with an electric hoist, moving it toward what would soon become an assembly line.

A bomb-building session had begun.

American Navy officers have a line they repeat passionately and often: A nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is an imposing and versatile manifestation of the United States’ power. A ship like the Stennis, they say, which was sending aircraft on missions over Iraq one day and over Afghanistan 36 hours later, allows Washington to project influence, unrestricted by borders or basing rights.

To that, Chief Petty Officer Jaime L. Evock, 33, added her own line.

She was watching over the sailors in the red shirts, the uniform that signifies ordnance handlers. They were putting together the parts that allow a carrier and its aircraft to reach inside another country and kill.

Whatever anyone thinks of air power, without munitions and the people who know them, she said, “this ship would just be a floating airport.”

There was something to this. At the end of the long chain of events that puts a carrier near a coastline and Navy strike fighters within range of a ground target, beyond the release point where the aircraft lets go of its ordnance, the final act lies with each missile or bomb descending through the air — which depends on the sailors who assembled it here.

On this night, the red shirts were handling a familiar staple. Each BLU-111 in the stack was a central part of a basic weapon of Western air-to-ground warfare — the general-purpose 500-pound bomb. Each contained 180 pounds of PBXN high explosive within an aerodynamic steel shell.

By itself, though, a bomb body is all but useless. That is where Chief Evock and her team came in: Their task was to carefully attach the components that made them live weapons. Think of a late-night game of Mr. Potato Head on the high seas.

Depending on the particular fins, fuzes and guidance packages that are attached, a BLU-111 can turn into a smart bomb guided by laser or GPS, or any of several kinds of “dumb” bombs, or an undersea mine. The weapon can be configured to penetrate a bunker, or to burrow into the dirt before bursting, thereby reducing the amount of lethal shrapnel and the intensity of the blast wave, to reduce the risk to noncombatants or unwanted damage to property. On this night Chief Evock’s team was filling orders from the carrier’s F/A-18 squadrons for a dozen unguided high-explosive bombs. Between flights to Afghanistan, air crews use these for training runs to maintain their qualifications.

The necessary parts had been carried here from a network of feeder magazines spread through the ship. Petty Officer Second Class Shawn M. Scheffler, 26, walked along the rack of parts as sailors called out lot numbers, compiling what is called a build sheet for each bomb.

For those expecting jangled nerves and beads of sweat as sailors handle explosives, this was the wrong place. Until assembled, released and armed, these bombs are stable. The red shirts worked methodically, with practiced precision and without the dramatic flair seen in “The Hurt Locker,” which covered the handling of explosives of a different sort.

Once the rear fuzes were inserted and set and the fins attached and tightened down, each bomb was ready to be rolled by cart to an elevator that would carry it up to the flight deck. Up there the bombs would be guarded in an area called the bomb farm, waiting to be fitted to aircraft.

The first of the bombs this night were ready in perhaps 10 minutes. Petty Officer First Class Joshua J. Austring, 28, roamed the line, ensuring that the components were tightened to the correct torque.

“Numerous things can go wrong,” he said. “We want to make sure that when the pilots are out there for the Marines, and the Marines ask for something to be dropped, that it is going to work.”

Throughout the process, the petty officers kept records, documenting each step in the assembly; the record sheets will follow each bomb to an aircraft, and through its eventual use.

If a weapon does not function properly, they said, the information on the sheets can be shared with explosive ordnance disposal teams on the ground to help make an unexploded bomb safe. They can also be used to identify mistakes by the red shirts. “If there is a dud, it comes back to me,” Petty Officer Scheffler said.

The sheets are also used when a bomb is flown on a sortie but not dropped; it is returned to this space to be disassembled and all the components accounted for.

Behind Petty Officer Scheffler was the handiwork of previous shifts: bombs to be guided by laser, bombs with GPS antennas in their tails, bombs to explode on impact or in midair.

The Stennis was wrapping up its tour in the Middle East and the Arabian Sea. Soon it would hand off responsibility for providing air support in Afghanistan to another carrier steaming its way.

The red shirts this night did not yet know it, but none of the bombs they assembled would be dropped in Afghanistan, where the use of air-to-ground force has declined as the conditions and tactics on the ground have changed. They would soon be broken back down and the parts checked and stored, and the Stennis’s bow pointed east, toward home.

 

Direct Link:  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/world/middleeast/on-aircraft-carrier-stennis-sailors-9-decks-down-build-the-bombs.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha22